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 A B S T R A C T  
The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of law system for investor protec-
tion on implementation of corporate governance at company level and degree of con-
vergence of local accounting standards to IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards). The result shows that investor protection has positive effect on implemen-
tation of corporate governance and degree of convergence of local standard to IFRS. 
The evidence is consistent with the argument that firm can establish law environment 
well for their own, but the quality of corporate investor protection via implementation 
of corporate governance mechanisms will depend on efficiency of judicial system of the 
country where the firm operates; and the quality of accounting standard in one coun-
try is a signal of country’s commitment to investor protection in order to provide good 
protection for its investor; a country will tend to adopt higher quality of accounting 
standard to ensure financial reporting transparency. This indicates that investor pro-
tection can be the key to the quality of other governance mechanisms, both at institu-
tional level such as accounting standards, and also at firm level such as corporate 
governance implementation.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis pengaruh sistem hukum untuk per-
lindungan investor pada pelaksanaan tata kelola perusahaan pada tingkat perusahaan 
dan tingkat konvergensi standar akuntansi lokal untuk IFRS (International Financial 
Reporting Standards). Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa perlindungan investor 
memiliki efek positif pada pelaksanaan tata kelola perusahaan dan tingkat konvergensi 
standar lokal untuk IFRS. Bukti ini konsisten dengan argumen bahwa perusahaan 
dapat membangun lingkungan hukum baik bagi mereka sendiri, tetapi kualitas perlin-
dungan investor perusahaan melalui penerapan mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan 
akan tergantung pada efisiensi sistem peradilan di negara tempat perusahaan berope-
rasi; dan kualitas standar akuntansi di satu negara adalah sinyal komitmen negara 
untuk perlindungan investor dalam rangka memberikan perlindungan yang baik 
kepada investor tersebut; negara akan cenderung mengadopsi kualitas yang lebih 
tinggi dari standar akuntansi untuk memastikan transparansi pelaporan keuangan. 
Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa perlindungan investor dapat menjadi kunci untuk kuali-
tas mekanisme pemerintahan lainnya, baik di tingkat kelembagaan seperti standar 




In financing a firm, an investor usually gets rights 
and particular authority protected by law through 
law enforcement. If a firm breaches that right, fund 
provider can charge firm at justice to get right for it 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). There are some differ-
ences in corporate governance system across coun-
try because of different law and enforcement gives 
different provision for firm in giving protection to 
investors. Protection to right of stockholder is very 
important because in many countries, expropria-
tion of minority shareholders’ right by majority is 
so frequently done. 
La Porta et al. (2000) indicate that country ju-
risdiction approaches to corporate governance is 
the main key of corporate governance mechanisms 
* Corresponding author, email address: 1 ratnawardhani@yahoo.com. 
Ratna Wardhani: The role of investor … 
268 
which is the protection to extern investor (stock-
holder and creditor) trough law system which cov-
er regulation and its enforcement. Therefore, inves-
tor protection is the main key for corporate gover-
nance implementation in country level. Previous 
researches define investor protection in to several 
elements. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998 and 2006) arti-
culate the basics about how protection for investor 
is done which is via countries’ law tradition, corpo-
rate law, and capital market law. 
Besides, law system in the country can also af-
fect the quality of standard, particularly accounting 
standard adopted by that country. Countries that 
have better law system concerning investor protec-
tion tend to make a standard that protects stock-
holders’ rights. Hope et al. (2006) declare that coun-
try that gives good protection to its investor tends 
to adopt higher quality of accounting standard to 
ensure financial reporting transparency. The level 
of harmonization of accounting standard in a coun-
try is determined by prevailing law system at that 
country. Hope et al. (2006) also declare that interna-
tional accountings standard adoption in a country 
constitutes a signal of commitment to increase pro-
tection for investor. 
This research aims to analyze the effect of law 
system on the investor protection in implementa-
tion of corporate governance and degree conver-
gence of local accounting standard of a country to 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards). 
This is motivated by La Porta et al. (2000) and Hope 
et al. (2006) who conceptually stated that investor 
protection is the key of institutional mechanisms in 
a country in the mechanisms related to corporate 
governance and implementation of international 
accounting standards. Furthermore, this research 
extends La Porta et al. (2000) and Hope et al. (2006) 
by empirically test the relationship between inves-
tor protection and corporate governance mechan-
ism in firm level and the convergence of interna-
tional accounting standards. 
This research is expected to provide several 
contributions. First, it provides evidence how the 
investor protection can be the key factors to deter-
mine the quality of governance in a country and 
how the quality of financial reporting is reflected in 
the convergence level of country’s accounting stan-
dards to international standards, which has not 
been tested previously. Second, this research gives 
contribution about the effect of legal system to im-
plementation corporate governance at firm level 
and accounting standard convergence to interna-
tional standard in the context of Asian countries. 
Previous research on investor protection and IFRS 
adoption usually used perspectives from developed 
market such as Europe and America. There is only 
limited research that used Asia as a context. 
This research is done in the context of Asian 
countries consisting of Hong Kong, India, Indone-
sia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. These countries represent 
the diversity in law and accounting standard in 
Asian. Empirical evidence of this research will give 
interesting picture of legal system and accounting 
standard in Asia. It contributes to a practical impli-
cation to the implementation of corporate gover-
nance and adoption of international accounting 
standards. 
Third, this research gives methodological con-
tribution by using different measurement of IFRS 
convergence. Previous research measure the IFRS 
adoption by using an indicator variable whether a 
country has fully adopted IFRS or not without con-
sidering the level of convergence of the local stan-
dards to IFRS. This research measure the IFRS con-
vergence by scoring the degree of convergence of 
local accounting standards to IFRS based on 32 ac-
counting standards. By using this measurement, 
this research can capture the different levels of 
adoption between countries. 
There are several reasons why this research is 
important. Despite of the contributions mention 
above, there are some benefits in it. First, this re-
search is important in the era of IFRS adoption es-
pecially in Asia countries, which used two major 
approaches in IFRS adoption, big bang approach or 
convergence process approach. By investigating the 
effect of investor protection on degree of conver-
gence to IFRS, this research provide evidence how 
the legal system of a country effect the level of con-
vergence of local standards to IFRS. 
Second, this research is also important because 
it uses Asia as the setting. Asian Economic Crisis 
that happened in 1997 to the early of 2000 has lo-
wered the economic growth of the countries. The 
speed of recovery varies between countries. Some 
previous researchers said that corporate gover-
nance play an important role in the recovery 
process. By investigating the effect of investor pro-
tection on corporate governance implementation, 
this research gives insight to improve the corporate 
governance implementation quality the regulator 
must focus on the legal system of investor protec-
tion. 
Third, this research is also important for coun-
tries in Asia that face several free trade agreements, 
because governance, transparency, and legal pro-
tection to investor are the key success to increase 
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the cross border investment in the free trade era. By 
using 2004 and 2006 as the year of observation, this 
study may provide evidence of the effect of inves-
tor protection on the CG mechanisms and conver-
gence of IFRS in the early years of IFRS conver-
gence process in the Asia region. IFRS is an interna-
tional accounting standard that is being adopted in 
many countries, especially in Asia since 2002. Indo-
nesia itself has started the process of convergence 
to IFRS in 2004. Therefore, by observing in the pe-
riod, this study can provide early evidence of how 
the legal system for the protection against the in-
vestor can support the process of convergence of 
IFRS. As an implication, the results of this study 
can show how the adoption of the international 
accounting standards and improvement of the im-
plementation of corporate governance can succeed 
if supported by the legal system at the country level 
through the protection of investors. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Investor Protection 
The investors have some right protected by law. 
These rights, among others, are related to informa-
tion disclosed by the company, dividend distribu-
tion in fair proportion, vote in board elections, par-
ticipation in meetings of shareholders, the purchase 
of new securities, and the legal prosecution of in-
sider of the company over alleged expropriation, 
and call extraordinary shareholders' meeting (La 
Porta et al. 2000). If companies violate the rights, 
the funds providers could sue companies to the 
court to get their rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
There are some differences in corporate governance 
systems in many countries because of differences in 
legal system which are owned by the company to 
the funds providers and the differences in interpre-
tation and implementation of laws and regulations 
of the relevant parties (such as the court, policy, 
attorney, law maker, etc). 
Protection of shareholders’ rights is very im-
portant because in many countries, expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders 
is very frequent. Expropriation is very detrimental 
to the company's stakeholders, whether investors, 
creditors, employees environment, and economy of 
the country in general. In the end the expropriation 
could damage the financial system functions. 
La Porta et al. (2000) state that the primary key 
of the corporate governance mechanism is protec-
tion to outside investors (both shareholders and 
creditors) through the legal system which includes 
aspects of regulation and law enforcement aspects. 
Investor Protection is a legal system that covers 
rules, regulation, and enforcement to protect the 
rights of minority investor. La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998 and 2006) articulate basics about how protec-
tion for investor that is done via countries’ law tra-
dition, corporate law, and capital market law. 
Law tradition of a country is a basic legal form 
of a country in establishing a system of law. Basic 
law tradition of a country is classified based on 
country’s legal origin. La Porta et al. (1997) classi-
fied legal origin into two major groups, namely 
common law and civil law. The fundamental dif-
ference of the two legal traditions lies in the estab-
lishment of the legal system. Civil law uses acts and 
regulation as the primary tools in regulating the 
legal materials. In civil law the establishment and 
implementation of laws and regulations was made 
by the law expert such as law maker, police, attor-
ney, and prosecutor. The common law is created by 
judges based on the result of a specific legal dispute 
and it is stipulated by previous judicial decisions. 
La Porta et al. (1998) showed a common law 
country has better protection to minority share-
holder than in civil law country. This is due to dif-
ferences in legal philosophy in the two groups. In 
common law countries, judges can interpret legal 
principles are widely available, so it can perform 
authorization to make regulations that prohibit 
various forms of expropriation. Judicial explanation 
of why common law countries provide better pro-
tection for investors than civil law countries is ex-
plained by Coffee (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000b). 
The rule of law in common law countries is usually 
made by judges based on the general principles of 
justice. In this system the judge can use the prin-
ciples to make decisions that have not or even pro-
hibited in their statute. In the case of expropriation 
of investors, the judge can do what is called by Cof-
fee (2000) as the 'smell test' to evaluate whether 
outside investors aggrieved from expropriation that 
has never happened before. 
Yet, in the state that is based on civil law, be-
cause the legal arrangement is under any law, act 
or regulation, the parties conducting expropriation 
can use a legal loophole if the law does not address 
the problems faced by investors. In addition, the 
law is often formed based on the interests of certain 
parties who have great power so that the protection 
of minority investors is less attention. In the legal 
system, judges are not allowed to act outside the 
law, so that people in the company can find a way 
that is not explicitly prohibited in the regulations 
when making the expropriation of minority inves-
tors. 
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Other Investor Protection mechanism is related 
to corporate law and its enforcement. This mechan-
ism is measured by anti-director rights and law 
enforcement. Measurement variable of anti-director 
rights explained how strong legal system of a coun-
try protect minority shareholder from manager or 
majority shareholder in decision-making process, 
including in the process of voting. On the other 
hand, variable law enforcement explained the qual-
ity and how law enforcement is done effectively in 
a country. Law enforcement is part of Investor Pro-
tection mechanism which is very important because 
it can substitute legal weakness of a country. 
La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) measure the anti-
director rights by using the index established based 
on the commercial code, which consists of several 
aspects of investor protection that includes(i) the 
ability to vote by mail; (ii) the ability to gain control 
of shares during investors’ meetings; (iii) the possi-
bility of cumulative voting for directors; (iv) the ease 
of calling an extraordinary investors meeting; (v) the 
availability of mechanisms allowing minority inves-
tors to make legal claims against the directors; and 
(vi) the presence of shareholders’ preemptive rights 
that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote (La 
Porta et al. 1997: 1134). On the contrary, law en-
forcement variable comprises the measurement of 
four elements, namely:. (I) the efficiency of the judi-
cial system, (ii) the rule of law, (iii) corruption, and 
(iv) risk of expropriation (La Porta et al. 1998: 1124-
1125). Efficiency of judicial system and rule of law 
reflects the quality of law enforcement that is run-
ning in a country, while corruption and expropria-
tion risk reflects the constraint from the government 
for companies to do business. 
In addition, La Porta et al. (2006) also explain 
that Investor Protection mechanism work through 
capital market law (securities law). Fundamental 
factors from capital market law that form Investor 
Protection mechanism are disclosure requirements, 
litigation standards, and public enforcement. Dis-
closure requirement is about the completeness of 
disclosure on corporate prospectus. Litigation 
standard is level of procedural difficulty for litiga-
tion of loss due to mistake in firm’s prospectus and 
financial statements. In this case, public enforce-
ment is a power of securities commission, central 
bank, or other regulatory bodies in capital market. 
This measure covers characteristics of securities 
commission, power in law making, and power in 
doing the investigation, power in giving sanction 
such as suspending stock trading, and giving crim-
inal sanction if financial statements don't disclosed 
material information. 
Corporate Governance 
It is not sufficient to minimizing agency conflicts 
and the opportunity to expropriate minority share-
holders only based on legal system of investor 
protection at the country level. Various provisions 
of the law on investor protection in a country are 
not entirely binding. This is due to the flexibility at 
company level to choose the adoption level of the 
provision. A company may adopt at the level or 
lower level provisions, or may even voluntarily 
adopt additional provisions which were not man-
dated by its legal system with the aim to provide 
value added for its stakeholders (Easterbrook and 
Fischel 1991; Black-Gilson 1998). Therefore there is 
a possibility that a company in a country with the 
same law enforcement would provide different 
investor protection (Klapper and Love 2004). This 
shows that the company will implement the corpo-
rate governance at a certain level in accordance 
with the internal conditions. Furthermore, it will 
affect the quality of reporting of information gener-
ated by companies’ management. 
Corporate governance applied by firm is basi-
cally intended to settle agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Blair (1995) defines corporate go-
vernance as overall as structure legal, culture, and 
institutional which constitute: (i) what can be done 
by public firm; (ii) who deserved restrains firm; (iii) 
how firms operate; and (iv) how firms allocate the 
risk and return (Darmawati 2003, in Siregar 2005). 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) has developed principles of 
corporate governance that being followed by many 
countries in the world. OECD already publishes 
and Principles of Corporate Governance that con-
sist of four main pillars which is fairness, transpa-
rency, accountability, and responsibility (Darma-
wati 2003, in Siregar 2005). 
Klapper and Love (2004) prove that legal envi-
ronment related to protection to investor at a coun-
try will influence implementation of corporate go-
vernance at corporate level. If legal system at coun-
try level offers poor protection for its investor, it 
would be expensive for firm to adopt different pro-
vision from corporate law rule. This is because of 
the firm that must make different contract that non 
standard (one that not regulated by corporate ju-
risdictional in that country). Therefore, firm in a 
country that has poor legal environment will have 
limited ability to increase protection for its investor, 
and hence will have low score of corporate gover-
nance. 
Based upon above argument, it can be summa-
rized that legal environment and law enforcement 
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at a country level will influence firm decision in 
implementation of corporate governance. The bet-
ter law environment at a country level, the more 
demand in applying corporate governance prin-
ciples will excelsior. Thus, in this research it is pre-
conceived that investor protection has positive ef-
fect to implementation corporate governance on 
corporate level. 
Hypothesis that is proposed is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Country’s investor protection score 
has a positive effect on corporate governance index. 
Hypothesis 1 is built by considering other factors 
that influence the implementation of corporate go-
vernance on corporate level. Other factors which 
are chosen as control variables in the test are: (i) 
Logarithm of Total Asset (LTA); (ii) Sales Growth 
(GROWTH); (iii.) Ratio of Property, Plant, and 
Equipment to sales (PPESALES); (iv.) standard dev-
iation of stock return (STDRET); (v) previous pe-
riod performances (PRIORROE); (vi) dummy vari-
able for regulated industry (DREG); (vii) dummy 
year (DYEAR); and (viii) dummy country 
(DCOUNTRY). 
LTA is used to control the impact of company 
size on the level of implementation of corporate 
governance. The argument is that large companies 
tend to have a more complex agency problem, so 
that the mechanisms tend to require more stringent 
corporate governance (Klapper and Love 2004). 
GROWTH reflects the company's growth oppor-
tunities in the future. The company that is expe-
riencing high growth tends to require external fi-
nancing for expansion purposes. For that reason, 
the company will seek to create mechanisms for 
optimal corporate governance to facilitate in obtain-
ing financing (Klapper and Love 2004). Several 
previous studies use Price to Book Value or Price 
Earnings Multiple as a proxy for growth opportuni-
ties. This study did not use that proxy measure 
because it has consequences of sample deletion for 
sample with negative income or a negative book 
value. In addition, Price Book Value ratio or Price 
Earnings Multiple is a noisy measurement because 
of many factors that affect this measurement. For 
this reason, a growth opportunity is proxy by 
growth in sales. 
PPESALES used to control the impact of asset 
composition. This variable measures the relative 
importance of fixed capital in the firm's output. 
Companies that have a composition of intangible 
assets greater than the tangible assets will require 
governance mechanisms more stringently. This is 
due to the ease of controlling the tangible assets 
compared to intangible assets (Klapper and Love 
2004). STDRET is a variable that measures the vola-
tility of the company's stock price. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), in Bushman et al. (2004), state that the 
magnitude of stock price volatility will increase 
monitoring costs. Increasingly high cost of their 
monitoring, implementation of corporate gover-
nance will be increasingly needed. PRIORROE con-
trol the impact of past performance on the mechan-
isms of corporate governance. Hermalin and Weis-
bach (2002), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Kole 
(1996), in Bushman et al. (2004), states that the 
board composition and managerial ownership as 
part of corporate governance mechanism is influ-
enced by the performance of companies in the past. 
Companies who have good past performance will 
strive to maintain the performance and communi-
cate their performance, through the implementa-
tion of good corporate governance. 
DREG is the classification of regulated and un-
regulated industries which reflect differences in the 
implementation of corporate governance in regu-
lated and unregulated industries. Companies oper-
ating in regulated industries that are bound by 
government regulations that govern the mechan-
isms of corporate governance that must be met by 
the company. Therefore, the implementation of 
corporate governance in companies that should be 
better regulated than unregulated firms. In this 
case, DYEAR is a dummy variable for year, with 
2006 as reference year. Then, to control the hetero-
geneity of corporate governance throughout the 
country then used dummy variables for countries 
(DCOUNTRY). DCOUNTRY is a dummy variable 
for each country in the sample, with the Indonesian 
state as reference state. 
 
Degree of Convergence of Local Accounting 
Standard with IFRS 
With the higher demand of international trading and 
capital market growth, the need of international ac-
counting practices also increases (Abu-Ghazaleh 
1986). International accountings standard will in-
crease comparability of financial statement and it 
will be more reliable (Aljifri and Khasharmeh 2006). 
Therefore, the requirement of accounting harmoni-
zation gets bigger. To answer the need of interna-
tional accounting standard, on year 2000 Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), one 
that on year 2001 was changed to International Ac-
counting Standards Board (IASB), for harmonization 
to standard by published International Accounting 
Standards (IASs), which now is International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
IFRS has been applied by a number of coun-
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tries around the world, with different level of adop-
tion. Adopting IFRS can be done in five levels 
which are: (i) full adoption, where a country adopts 
all IFRS and translates it with word by word; (ii) 
adapted, where a country adopts all IFRS with 
several adjustment by condition a state; (iii) piece-
meal, where a state adopts several IFRS for a certain 
number of standard and chooses paragraph most 
indeed; (iv) referenced, where a state makes IFRS as 
reference information standard which is made by 
local standard maker; and (v) not adoption at all, 
where a state not at all adopts IFRS (Accounting 
media (2005), in Panggabean (2007)). 
The process of financial information reporting 
is much determined by the applicable accounting 
standards. Accounting standards in a country will 
determine the quality of financial information, par-
ticularly related to income information produced 
by companies. Adoption of IFRS as reporting stan-
dards ensures high quality of financial reporting, 
because it is based on international standards sup-
ported by the IASB as standard setter with world-
class competence. But on the other hand, the adop-
tion of IFRS may not be able to accommodate the 
special characteristics of a country. This occurs be-
cause the IASB as standard setter IFRS has mem-
bers that are mostly well-developed countries. 
Therefore, IFRS are not always entirely appropriate 
when applied in countries that have different cha-
racteristics with well-developed countries, so the 
adoption of IFRS should be tailored to the characte-
ristics of the country for the harmonization process 
to accommodate different characteristic across 
countries. 
IFRS is basically a principles based on stan-
dards. The excellence of principles-based stan-
dards over rule-based standards is that company 
able to implement corporate accounting standards 
in accordance with the special characteristics so 
that the resulting financial reporting will better 
reflect the economic value of the company. Ash-
baugh and Pincus (2001) showed that with in-
creasing convergence of local GAAP against the 
international standard, the disclosure require-
ments will be higher and restrictions in choices of 
accounting methods will also get larger. Addition-
ally, Barth et al. (2007) stated that by using IFRS, 
accounting quality can be improved by eliminat-
ing alternative accounting method that is less to 
reflect the company's performance and that can be 
used to manage earnings. 
The fact is that a better legal system in investor 
protection tends to make a standard and it can still 
provide a better protection to investor. IFRS consti-
tutes international accounting standard that more 
reputed superior as compared to another account-
ing standard (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Gassen 
and Sellhorn 2006; Barth et al. 2007; Meulen, Gae-
remynck, and Willekens 2007). Beatty et al. (1996) 
declare that purpose IFRS will increase financial 
reporting transparency, so investor will react posi-
tively. 
Daske et al. (2007) examined the economic con-
sequences of the use of IFRS that is mandatory for 
companies around the world. Their research 
proved that the use of IFRS is useful for countries 
that have strict enforcement regimes and well insti-
tutional environment that provide incentives for 
good reporting. In addition, their study also 
showed that the positive impact is weakening in 
conditions where local GAAP in some countries 
have approached the IFRS. In general, they con-
clude that the capital market economically benefi-
cial with the mandatory implementation of IFRS. 
However, these results may be affected by im-
provements in law enforcement and governance in 
this country to support the implementation of IFRS 
in financial reporting. Thus, this study concludes 
that the quality of financial reporting formed by 
many factors is related to the institutional envi-
ronment in a country specifically factors that re-
lated to reporting incentive, law enforcement, and 
accounting standard. 
Meanwhile Hope et al. (2006) declare that 
states that have high commitment to investor pro-
tection will tend to adopt IFRS. They stated that the 
adoption of IFRS in a country is a signal of com-
mitment to improve protection for investors. There-
fore, the protection of investors will affect the quali-
ty of earnings indirectly through the process of 
establishing accounting standards. 
Argument that is proposed in this research is 
that a state that have good law environment and 
gives better investor protection will encourage the 
convergence of international accounting standard 
to establish the better standard, which is via con-
vergence with IFRS. Base on that argument, there-
fore investor protection will positively affect degree 
of convergence of GAAP local with IFRS. Hypothe-
sis that is proposed is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Country’s investor protection score 
has a positive effect on index degree of convergence 
of local GAAP with IFRS at one particular state. 
Hypothesis 1 is built by considering other factors 
that influence the degree of convergence of local 
GAAP with IFRS at one particular state. Other 
factors that are chosen as control variables are: (i) 
Country Earnings Management (CEM); (ii) Coun-
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try Market Capitalization (CMCAP); (iii) Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (GDPCAP); (iv) 
dummy year (DYEAR); and (v) dummy country 
(DCOUNTRY). 
CEM is the average value of the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals for all companies listed on 
the stock in a country (outside the companies in-
cluded in the financial industry, real estate, and 
property). This variable is a proxy of the extent to 
which people can behave in an opportunist in a 
country. If the level of earnings management is 
high, then people in to take personal advantage 
without being noticed. To limit the personal bene-
fit, from the perspective of the country, high levels 
of earnings management will encourage countries 
to adopt better accounting standards through con-
vergence of IFRS as a mechanism to limit earnings 
management (Renders and Gaeremynck 2005). 
The use of CEM variable in estimating the ef-
fect of protection for investors against the level of 
convergence of local GAAP to IFRS is assumed that 
the CEM is an exogenous variable. Use of this as-
sumption contains a weakness that is the possibility 
that the CEM is influenced by the quality of corpo-
rate governance in both state and corporate level. 
This study did not consider the possible problems 
of bias on this variable, and suggested this problem 
to be investigated in further research. 
The second control variable is the scale 
CMCAP to GDP. These variables are selected based 
on the view that capital markets are developed 
(well-developed) usually require a high level of 
disclosure (Jaggi and Low 2000, Renders and Gae-
remynck 2005), so the level of convergence with 
IFRS tends to be higher. The third control variable 
is GDPCAP which reflects the level of welfare or a 
country's economic growth. Countries with ad-
vanced economies will seek to attract foreign in-
vestment and encourage domestic companies to 
seek funds from foreign parties. Therefore, the 
more advanced a country, the higher the level of 
convergence with international standards (Jaggi 
and Low 2000, Renders and Gaeremynck 2005). In 
addition, DYEAR is a dummy variable for this year, 
with 2006 as reference year. Then, it is to control the 
heterogeneity of corporate governance throughout 
the country by using dummy variables for coun-
tries (DCOUNTRY). DCOUNTRY is a dummy va-
riable for each country in the sample, with the In-
donesian state as reference. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Data Source and Sample Selection 
This study observes the effect of investor protection 
on the corporate governance and IFRS convergence 
within the period of 2004 and 2006. This period 
provides early evidence on how the relationships 
arise in the period of early adoption and conver-
gence process of IFRS in many countries in Asia. 
Some countries started to fully adopt or partially 
adopt IFRS in this period, and many others are still 
in the early process of convergence, such as Indo-
nesia. Data and data source in this research is as 
follows: (1) firm’s financial data taken from ORISIS 
data based, stock exchange web site and firm web 
site for the period of 2004 and 2006; (2) investor 
protection data that consisting of: legal tradition, 
corporate law & enforcement, and securities law; 
(3) Data corporate governance index from Credit 
Lyonnaise Securities Asia (CLSA) corporate gover-
nance survey report (CG Watch Report 2005 and 
2007, to capture the CG condition of 2004 and 2006); 
(4) data on degree of convergence of local GAAP 
with IFRS, measured level of convergence among 
local accounting standard a state with IFRS based 
on similarities and differences of local GAAP to 
IFRS in 2004 and 2006 publish by Big 4 Accounting 
Firms. 
Data are still relevant nowadays because the 
legal system of investor protection, corporate go-
vernance implementation, and level of convergence 
of local standards to IFRS did not change signifi-
cantly from period used in this study to the date. If 
there are changes in these variables, these changes 
tend to be in line together. Based on this fact, the 
finding from this research which based on the esti-
mation using this period of data will be still rele-
vant to the date. This time frame is used by this 
research because many countries in Asia that used 
the convergence process approach in adopting IFRS 
starts to change the local standards and converge to 
IFRS. By using this time frame we can capture the 
varieties among countries in adopting IFRS. 
Sample criteria are: (1) companies listed in 
stock exchange at ten states in Asian which is: 
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malay-
sia, Philippine, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand; 
(2) firm that is covered by CLSA CG Watch 2005 
and 2007; (3) Excluding financial industrial (bank, 
leasing, and insurance), real estate, and property; 




The Model to test the effect of investor protection 
on corporate governance implementation is pre-
sented in Model 1 and Model 2 and the description 
of variables in Table 1. 
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Model 1 
GOVi,t = γ0 + γ1IPi,t+ γ2LTAi,t+ γ3GROWTHi,t+ 
γ4PPESALESi,t + γ5STDRETi,t + γ6PRIORROEi,t + 
γ7DREGi,t + γ8DYEARi,t + γ9DCOUNTRYi,t + εi,t (1) 
Research hypothesis can be presented in statistical 
form as follows: H1 : γ 1 > 0. Expectation for each 
one control variable is as follows: γ 2 > 0; γ 3 > 0; γ 4 
< 0; γ 5 > 0; γ 6 > 0; γ 7 > 0; γ 8 ≠ 0; γ 9 - 17 ≠ 0. 
The Model to test the effect of investor protec-
tion on degree convergence GAAP locals with IFRS 
as follows: 
Model 2 
IFRSi,t = δ0 + δ1IPi,t + δ2CEMi,t+ δ3CMCAPi,t + δ4Log 
GDPCAPi,t +δ5DYEARi,t + δ6-14DCOUNTRYi,t + εi,t. (2) 
Research hypothesis can be presented in statistical 
form as follows: H2 : δ 1 > 0. Expectation for each 
one control variable is as follows: δ 2 ≠ 0; δ 3 > 0; δ 4 
> 0; δ 5 ≠ 0; δ 6 - 14 ≠ 0. 
 
Operational Definition of Variables 
Investor Protection 
Investor protection is measured by legal tradition, 
corporate law and enforcement, and securities law 
(La Porta et al. 1998, 2006). Corporate law and en-
forcement consists of two components namely the 
anti-director rights index and rule of law. Value of 
index for the investor protection is the sum of the 
values for each of the four components of investor 
protection. Those components are assessed by giv-
ing the value 1 for countries that are classified as 
countries with better protection for investors (clas-
sified into "high"), and the value of 0 for countries 
that are classified as countries with poor investor 
protection (classified into "low"). Thus, the maxi-
mum value for a country is four and the minimum 
value is zero. 
Legal origin of a country is measured by dum-
my variables with value 1 for common law countries 
and the value 0 for the civil law countries. Since the 
legal origin is not change trough time, this research 
uses classification of countries by legal origin based 
on La Porta et al. (1998). Common law country is 
considered as a country that provides good protec-
tion for investors ("high" = value 1), and a civil law 
country is considered as a country that provide poor 
protection for investors ("low"= value 0). 
Corporate law and enforcement is measured 
by anti-director rights index, which consists of six 
items such as: the ability to vote by mail, the ability 
to gain control of shares during investors’ meeting, 
the possibility of cumulative voting for directors, 
the ease of calling an extraordinary investors meet-
ing, the availability of mechanism allowing minori-
ty investors to make legal claims against the direc-
tors, the presence of shareholders’ pre-emptive 
rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ 
vote. Anti-director rights are usually regulated in 
the corporate act of the country. This regulation is 
also not change in time. Like the legal origin, this 
research also used classification of countries by 
anti-director right based on La Porta et al. (1998). A 
country is considered as a country that provides 
good protection for investors ("high" = value 1) if 
the country’s anti-director rights index is above or 
equal to median value, and poor protection for in-




IP Score of investor protection which consist of legal origin, corporate law & enforcement, and securities 
law. 
GOV Corporate governance index 
IFRS Score of degree of convergence of local GAAP with IFRS 
LTA Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
GROWTH percentage of sales growth from previous year 
PPESALES Ratio of total property, plan, & equipment, divided by total net sales  
STDRET Standard Deviation of monthly return in one year 
PRIORROE Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation divided by total equity in the year of t-1 
DREG Industry Dummy with value of 1 if company is included in regulated industry and 0 if other. Included 
as regulated industry are oil and gas, telecommunication, and utilities. This industry classification based 
on two digit of SEC Code.  
CEM Country Earnings Management, The average value of all corporate earnings management in a country 
CMCAP Total value of market capitalization on the stock of a country divided by the value of GDP 
Log GDPCAP Natural Logarithm of level of GDP per capita in one country 
DYEAR Dummy variable which stands 1 for observation of year 2006 and 0 for other 
DCOUNTRY Dummy variable which stands 1 for country related to the observation and 0 for other, Indonesia as 
reference 
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anti-director rights index is bellow than median 
value. 
On the other hand, the law enforcement covers 
the four aspects (La Porta et al. 1998), namely: (1) 
Efficiency of the judicial system; (2) Rule of law; (3) Cor-
ruption; (4) Risk of expropriation. Since the law en-
forcement in a country tends to vary across time, this 
study uses value of those four aspects from Interna-
tional Country Risk (IRC) yearly report. Because the 
report usually capture the previous condition of the 
country, and to match with CG report this research 
use 2005 and 2007 report to capture the law en-
forcement in 2004 and 2006. A country is considered 
as a country that provides good investor protection 
("high" = value 1) if it scores above or equal to me-
dian value, and 0 otherwise. 
Securities Law includes three aspects of inves-
tor protection governed by the laws of capital mar-
kets (La Porta et al. 2006), namely: (i) the disclosure 
requirement; (ii) litigation standards, and (iii) the 
public enforcement. A country is considered as a 
country that provides good investor protection 
("high" = value 1) if it scores above or equal to me-
dian efficiency of the disclosure requirement, litiga-




This variable measures the level of implementation 
of corporate governance at the company level. This 
study employs corporate governance score devel-
oped by the Asian Securities Credit Lyonnais 
(CLSA), as presented in the CLSA CG Watch 2005 
and 2007 report. Since CLSA reports made periodi-
cally once every two years, this research uses two 
separates years of observation, 2004 and 2006. The 
report use in this research is 2005 and 2007 because 
it reports the survey result from the previous year. 
Corporate governance index value from CLSA CG 
Watch 2005 refers to condition of corporate gover-
nance in 2004 and corporate governance index val-
ue from CLSA CG Watch 2007 refers to condition of 
corporate governance in 2006. The score covers 
management discipline, transparency, independen-
cy, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and so-
cial awareness. 
 
Degree of Convergence of Local GAAP with IFRS 
The variable degree of convergence of local GAAP 
to IFRS measures the level of similarities of local 
accounting standards to the international account-
ing standards. Twenty international accounting 
standards are employed as a basis for measuring 
degree of convergence. In measuring degree of 
convergence, this study uses a scale of 1 to 4 with 
gradations: (i) there is no equivalent standard of 
local GAAP (1 point); (ii) there is an equivalent 
standard in the local GAAP but not the same as 
IFRS (2 points); (iii) there is an equivalent standard 
in local GAAP and same with IFRS with certain 
exceptions (3 points); (iv) and there is an equivalent 
standards in local GAAP and same with IFRS for all 
material aspects (4 points). 
The degree of convergence is the average score 
or value of the 20 standards used as mentioned 
above. This measurement is based on the 2005 and 
2007 reports of similarities and differences between 
of local GAAP to IFRS issued by Big 4 public ac-
counting firms such as Ernst & Young, Pricewater-
house Cooper, Deloitte, and KPMG (the 2005 report 
represents the condition in 2004 and the 2007 report 
represents 2006 condition). The countries used in 
this research have a variety of degree of conver-
gence of Local GAAP to IFRS. The variety depends 
on the approach used to adopt IFRS. There are two 
major approaches to adopt IFRS, big bang approach 
and gradual adoption approach. For example, In-
donesia and some other countries have started the 
Table 2 
Samples Selection Procedures 
The number of listed companies in 11 countries 10,498 
Number of firms surveyed by CLSA in 2004 and 2006 582 
Number of companies in China are included in the CLSA survey (60) 
Companies in Finance, Real Estate, and Property Industry (110) 
Company with incomplete data (82) 
Total sample firms  330 
Total firms years observation before excluding outlier 660 
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convergence process in 2002. The approach used to 
adopt IFRS is gradual adoption. Thus, even though 
Indonesia claimed to adopt IFRS in 2012, the 
process of adoption actually started from 2002. 
Some countries like Singapore and Hong Kong 
used big bang approach to adopt IFRS. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Sample 
Sample selection procedure can be seen in Table 2. 
It consists of 330 companies. Observation is consi-
dered an outlier and is deleted if it is outside the 
range of the average ± three times the standard 
deviation for each variable in each research model. 
This study got 612 firms in the year of observa-
tions for Model 1 and 660 firms in the year of ob-
servations for Model 2. The number of sample 
firms is relatively small compared to the number of 
listed companies in ten countries covered in this 
study. However, since the sample firms represent 
high proportion of total market capitalization, this 
study concluded that the sample companies fairly 
represent the stock markets of the countries in this 
study. 
Descriptive Statistic of Investor Protection, Im-
plementation of Corporate Governance, and De-
gree of Convergence of Local GAAP to IFRS 
across Countries 
In Figure 1, it shows countries with high score of 
investor protection are Hong Kong, India, Malay-
sia, and Singapore. These countries are common 
law countries that have above median score of anti 
directors’ right, law enforcement and securities law. 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan that are a civil law coun-
try that has above median score of anti directors’ 
right, law enforcement and securities law. 
Countries that give poor protection to inves-
tor among the 10 countries are Indonesia, Philip-
pine, and Thailand. For Philippines, the score 
shows that the weakness of investor protection is 
on the law enforcement and for Thailand the 
weakness of investor protection is on the regula-
tion about anti directors’ right and the law en-
forcement. Indonesia is the country with the poor-
est investor protection among ten countries in 
Asia. The above median score for Indonesia is 
only in securities law. 
Descriptive statistic of corporate governance 
 
Figure 1 
Investor Protection Score by Classification of “High” and “Low” among Ten Countries in Asia  
 
Table 3 
Statistic Descriptive of Corporate Governance Implementation among 10 Countries in Asia 
Country 
Mean Median Min Max StDev 
2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 
Hongkong 60 60 50 65 24 25 96 92 24 17 
India 55 60 49 63 25 30 92 93 18 16 
Indonesia 47 47 48 49 16 14 80 72 16 18 
Japan 69 72 72 77 40 37 92 94 13 14 
Korea 41 46 35 43 22 27 62 65 13 11 
Malaysia 58 58 63 62 23 27 76 80 14 14 
Philippines 45 48 43 47 20 22 66 69 15 14 
Singapore 73 74 76 77 50 50 90 90 11 10 
Taiwan  61 63 60 64 31 32 79 80 10 10 
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Legal tradition Anti Directors Right Enforcement Securities Law
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implementation can be shown in Table 3. It shows 
that companies in Singapore and Japan have the 
highest average of corporate governance index for 
period of 2004 and 2006. Country that has the low-
est index of corporate governance is Korea for year 
of 2004 and 2006. Indonesia has the third lowest 
quality of corporate governance implementation 
after Korea and Philippine for year of 2004 and 
2006. This score has also indicates that Indonesia’s 
firm do not experience of improvement from 2004 
through 2006. 
Figure 2 shows a descriptive statistic of the av-
erage of degree of convergence of local GAAP to 
IFRS for 2004 and 2006. From Figure 2, it can be 
found that local GAAP of the sample countries rela-
tively already convergence to IFRS. This reflects 
from value of average degree of convergence that 
approach score of three. This means that in average 
the country has already an equivalent standard in 
their local GAAP and similar to IFRS, with certain 
exception such as there are differences in disclosure 
requirement, measurement alternative, and little 
different about standard coverage. This figure also 
shows that Singapore and Hong Kong are countries 
with highest convergence to IFRS and Taiwan is 
country with the lowest convergence in 2004 and 




Average of Degree of Convergence of Local GAAP to IFRS among 10 Countries in Asia  
 
Table 3 
Statistic Descriptive of Model 1: The Effect of Investor Protection to Corporate Governance Implementation  
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness 
LOGGOV 4.045 2.660 4.570 0.319 -1.137 
LOGIP 1.077 0.000 1.390 0.370 -1.698 
GROWTH 0.259 -0.723 2.046 0.292 2.072 
LTA 13.83 8.001 21.06 2.278 0.366 
PPESALES 0.672 0.008 4.126 0.681 2.058 
STDRET 0.100 0.014 0.337 0.051 1.410 
PRIORROE 20.45 -82.93 102.7 17.16 0.705 
DREG Proportion of regulated industry = 32.4% Proportion of unregulated industry = 67.6% 
Valid N (list wise) 612 
Table Information: This table represents a descriptive statistic of each variable used in Model 1. This table aims to give description 
about central tendency, variance, and data distribution for data used in estimate Model 1. Dependent variable in this model is 
LOGGOV, which is natural logarithm of corporate governance index. Independent variable in this model is LOGIP which is natural 
logarithm of score of investor protection. Control Variable in this model is LTA (Natural Logarithm of Total Assets); GROWTH 
(percentage of sales growth from previous year); PPESALES (Ratio of total property, plan, & equipment, divided by total net sales); 
STDRET (Standard Deviation of monthly return in one year ); PRIORROE (income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operation divided by total equity in the year of t-1; DREG (Industry Dummy with value of 1 if company is included in regulated 
industry and 0 if other, regulated industry is consist of the industry oil and gas, telecommunication, and utilities which the industry 







Tahun 2004  3.30  2.60  2.80  3.05  2.85  2.90  2.70  3.75  2.55  2.60 
Tahun 2006  3.70  2.85  3.00  3.40  3.40  3.50  2.95  3.85  3.35  2.85 
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The Effect of Investor Protection to Corporate 
Governance Implementation 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 and Table 4 point out the data utilized to 
estimate Model 1. Since the model is found with 
heteroscedasticity problem, the model is trans-
formed into a log function whereas the dependent 
variable and main independent variable are trans-
formed in to natural logarithm. Descriptive statistics 
on Table 1 shows that from scale 1 until 100, average 
value GOV (anti logarithm of 4.045 = 57.11) showed 
that in average sample firm has low quality of im-
plementation of corporate governance. Meanwhile, 
from score of Investor Protection, from scale 0 until 
4, average value IP (anti logarithm of 1.077 = 2.93) 
indicate that on an average ten countries in this 
study has given quite good investor protection. 
 
Regression Result 
Model 1 is regressed to test hypothesis 1. The result 
can be seen on Table 4. Based on t test on each vari-
able, hypothesis 2 showed that investor protection 
has a positive effect to index corporate governance. 
The relationship was accepted on 1% level of signi-
ficance. This proves the argument that better law 
environment at a state will enforce the companies 
to apply principles corporate governance in higher 
quality. This result is consistent with Klapper and 
Love (2004) that find positive relationship among 
judicial efficiency and anti directors’ right index as 
component in investor protection, with ranking 
corporate governance. 
 
The Effect of Investor Protection on Degree Con-
vergence GAAP Local with IFRS 
Descriptive Statistic 
Table 5 shows a descriptive statistics for the effect 
of investor protection on degree of the convergence 
for GAAP locals with IFRS. Descriptive statistic on 
Table 5 shows that from measurement scale 1-4, 
average value of IFRS (anti logarithm of 1.118 = 
3.058) indicates that on an average 10 states that at 
observation in this research has relative accounting 
standard that is already convergent to IFRS. 
Table 4 
Regression Result for Model 1: The Effect of Investor Protection to Corporate Governance Implementation 
Model 1 
Log GOVi,t = γ0 + γ1Log IPi,t+ γ2LTAi,t+ γ3GROWTHi,t+ γ4PPESALESi,t + γ5STDRETi,t + γ6PRIORROEi,t + γ7DREGi,t + 
γ8DYEARi,t + γ9-17DCOUNTRYi,t + εi,t 
Dependent Variable: Log GOV 
Independent Variables Sign Expectation Coefficient Significance VIF 
C ? ***3.0752 0.000  
LOG(IP) + ***0.1399 0.003 1.96 
LTA + ***0.0654 0.000 1.72 
GROWTH + ***-0.1119 0.004 1.15 
PPESALES - **-0.0419 0.015 1.42 
STDRET + ***-0.7645 0.001 1.37 
PRIORROE + **0.0012 0.032 1.19 
DREG + 0.0159 0.463 1.16 
DYEAR +/- 0.0094 0.621 1.07 
DCOUNTRY +/- DCOUNTRY Variables are included in the model. Dummy 
countries that has significant coefficient are Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan.  
F test Sign 0.0000  
Adj R Square 0.4857  
N 612  
***Significant at level of 1% 
** Significant at level of 5% 
* Significant at level of 10% 
Table Information: This table represents regression result to estimate Model 1. This table aims to give result of estimation test using 
data panel analysis using common intercept. Dependent variable in this model is LOGGOV, which is natural logarithm of corporate 
governance index. The independent variable is LOGIP which is natural logarithm of score of investor protection which consist of 
legal origin, corporate law & enforcement, and securities law.  
 The control Variable is LTA (Natural Logarithm of Total Assets); GROWTH (percentage of sales growth from previous year); 
PPESALES (Ratio of total property, plan, & equipment, divided by total net sales); STDRET (Standard Deviation of monthly return 
in one year ); PRIORROE (income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation divided by total equity in the year of t-1; 
DREG (Industry Dummy with value of 1 if company is included in regulated industry and 0 if other; DYEAR (Dummy variable 
which stands 1 for observation of year 2006 and 0 for other); and DOCOUNTRY (Dummy variable which stands 1 for country 
related to the observation and 0 for other, Indonesia as reference).  
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Regression Result 
To test hypothesis 1, this study uses regression of 
Model 1. The result can be seen on Table 6. Based 
on t test on each variable, hypothesis 2 is accepted, 
showing that investor protection has a positive ef-
fect on the index of degree of convergence GAAP 
local with IFRS at one particular state at 1% level of 
significance. It is means that a state with good law 
environment gives high protection for its investor 
will encourage standards setter to establish the bet-
ter standard, which is via convergence with IFRS. 
This result is consistent with Hope et al. (2006) that 
state with good protection for its investor will tend 
to adopt accounting standard that ensure financial 
reporting transparency. 
 
Discussion and Analysis 
This research provides empirical evidence on the 
positive effect of investor protection on the quality 
of corporate governance. It is consistent with Klap-
per and Love (2004), because it also proves that the 
legal environment related the protection of inves-
tors in one country across Asia also affect the appli-
cation of corporate governance at the company 
level. If the legal system offers a weak protection 
for investors, it is expensive for companies to adopt 
different provisions of the law because it means 
that the company must make a non-standard con-
tract (which is not regulated in the law of the coun-
try). Therefore, the company in a country that gen-
erally has a weak legal environment will have li-
mited ability to increase protection for the investor, 
and therefore will have a lower value of corporate 
governance. Klapper and Love (2004) showed that 
companies that are in a country that has a weak 
legal system, on average, have lower ranking go-
vernance. 
These results also support the theoretical ar-
guments proposed by Shleifer and Wolfensohn 
(2002), in Klapper and Love (2004), which states 
that the company will not be able to creating a legal 
environment for their own good, but they must rely 
on the efficiency of the judicial system in which 
they are located. Then, Klapper and Love (2004) 
also states that if the environment weak corporate 
law, the company will not be able to "overwrite" 
against the legal system in the country and the 
company's flexibility in efforts to improve corpo-
rate governance to be limited. Therefore the quality 
of implementation of corporate governance in a 
company will strongly influenced by the quality of 
the legal system in the country. 
This research also provides empirical evidence 
about the positive effect of investor protection on 
the degree on convergence of local GAAP with 
IFRS. Countries which have a legal system of pro-
tection for investors better tend to make a standard 
that supports the rights of shareholders of the com-
panies in the country. The improvements are in the 
protection for investors in a country because the 
requirement discloses more transparent informa-
tion is higher. IFRS is an international accounting 
standards which are considered to be more supe-
rior compared with other accounting standards 
(Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; Gassen and Sellhorn 
2006; Barth et al. 2007; Meulen, Gaeremynck, and 
Willekens 2007). Beatty et al. (1996) stated that the 
use of IFRS will increase the transparency of finan-
cial reporting, so that investors will react positively 
to it. While Hope et al. (2006) found that countries 
that have a high commitment in the protection for 
investors will tend to adopt IFRS. 
Protection for investors influences the forma-
tion of accounting standards in a country. A coun-
Table 5 
Statistic Descriptive of Model 1: The Effect of Investor Protection to Degree of Convergence of Local GAAP to IFRS 
Variable Names Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness 
LOGIFRS 1.118 0.940 1.350 0.127 0.168 
LOGIP 1.069 0.000 1.390 0.398 -1.298 
CEM 0.009 0.000 0.026 0.008 0.871 
LOGGDPCAP 8.716 6.420 10.50 1.412 -0.179 
CMCAP 0.365 0.059 1.819 0.340 2.398 
Valid N (listwise) 660 
Table Information: This table represents the descriptive statistics of each variable used in Model 1. The purpose of this tab le is to 
give an idea about the condition of central tendency, spread, and distribution of the data used in estimating Model 1. The  
dependent variable in this model is LOG IFRS. The independent variable in this model is LOGIP. Yet, other independent variabl es 
used as control variables are the CEM, GDP, CMCAP, and Log GDPCAP.  
 The operational definition of each variable is as follows:  (i) LOGIFRS: Natural Logarithm of score of degree of convergence of local 
GAAP with IFRS; (ii) LOGIP: natural logarithm of score of investor protection which consist of legal origin, corporate law & 
enforcement, and securities law, (iii) CEM: The average value of all corporate earnings management in a country, (iv) CMCAP: 
Total value of market capitalization on the stock of a country divided by the value of GDP, (v) Log GDPCAP: Natural Logarithm  of 
level of GDP per capita in one country. 
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try that has a good legal system and institutionally 
provides a strong protection for investors tends to 
make a better standard accounting. Previous stu-
dies, such as Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), Gassen 
and Sellhorn (2006), Barth et al. (2007), Meulen, 
Gaeremynck, and Willekens (2007) generally 
showed that IFRS is more superior as compared to 
US GAAP or local GAAP of a country. Therefore, 
with improvements in the protection for investors 
in a country, there is a tendency to adopt to better 
accounting standards. Results of this study prove 
that the stronger protection for investors, the higher 
the degree of convergence of local GAAP with 
IFRS. These results are consistent with Hope et al. 
(2006) stating that countries that provide good pro-
tection for investors will tend to adopt accounting 
standards that guarantee the transparency financial 
reporting. 
The implication of these results is that the In-
donesian government should conduct the im-
provement of legal system and enforcement, both 
in terms of the firm law as well as capital market 
law. The improvement must have a purpose to 
provide better protection for investors, especially 
minority investors. 
The improvements must be in the quality of 
the legal system in a country, the standard account-
ing adopted in the country, corporate governance 
implemented at the corporate level will be more 
effective. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
Several conclusions can be derived from this re-
search. First, a better investor protection can lead to 
the better implementation quality corporate gover-
nance. This finding is consistent with Klapper and 
Love (2004) who also find positive relationship 
among judicial efficiency and anti directors’ right 
as component in investor protection with level cor-
porate governance. This result is also consistent 
with argument by Shleifer and Wolfenson (2002) in 
Klapper and Love (2004), that the firm can establish 
law environment well for their own, but the quality 
of corporate investor protection via implementation 
of corporate governance mechanisms will depend 
on efficiency of judicial system of the country 
where the firm operates. 
Besides, it is recommended that the company 
should have a better investor protection so that 
they can encourage the higher convergence of the 
accounting standard to IFRS. This is in line with the 
Table 6 
Regression Result of Model 2: The Effect of Investor Protection to Degree of Convergence of Local GAAP to IFRS 
Model 
Log IFRSi,t = δ0 + δ1Log IPi,t + δ2CEMi,t+ δ3CMCAPi,t + δ4Log GDPCAPi,t +δ5DYEARi,t + δ6-14DCOUNTRYi,t + εi,t 
Dependent Variable: Log GOV 
Independent Variable Sign Expectation Coefficient Significance VIF 
C ? ***0.5449 0.000  
LOG(IP) + ***0.1264 0.000 1.21 
CEM +/- ***0.8948 0.000 1.09 
CMCAP + ***0.0310 0.000 1.23 
LOG(GDPCAP) + ***0.0654 0.000 1.39 
DYEAR +/- ***0.0745 0.000 1.08 
DCOUNTRY +/- DCOUNTRY Variables are included in the model. All 
Dummy countries variables are significant.  
F test Sign 0.0000  
Adj R Square  0.9868  
N 660  
***Significant at level of 1% 
** Significant at level of 5% 
* Significant at level of 10% 
Table Information: This table represent regression result to estimate Model 2. This table aims to give result of estimation test using 
data panel analysis using common intercept. The dependent variable in this model is LOG IFRS. The independent variable in this 
model is LOGIP. While other independent variables used as control variables are the CEM, GDP, CMCAP, Log GDPCAP, DYEAR, 
and DCOUNTRY.  
The operational definition of each variable is as follows: (i) LOGIFRS: Natural Logarithm of score of degree of convergence of local 
GAAP with IFRS; (ii) LOGIP: natural logarithm of score of investor protection which consist of legal origin, corporate law & 
enforcement, and securities law, (iii) CEM: The average value of all corporate earnings management in a country, (iv) CMCAP: 
Total value of market capitalization on the stock of a country divided by the value of GDP, (v) Log GDPCAP: Natural Logarithm of 
level of GDP per capita in one country; (vi) DYEAR: Dummy variable which stands 1 for observation of year 2006 and 0 for other; 
and (vii) DOCOUNTRY: Dummy variable which stands 1 for country related to the observation and 0 for other, Indonesia as 
reference. 
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argument by Hope et al. (2006) who also found that 
to give good protection for its investor a country 
will tend to adopt higher quality of accounting 
standard to ensure financial reporting transparen-
cy. It indicates that a country should reform the law 
system related to investor protection in order to 
increase demand for better accounting standards. 
Several limitations of this research that should 
be noted for future research as the following: (i) 
subjective judgment in developed a measure of the 
level of convergence of local GAAP to IFRS with 
comparisons between the local GAAP to IFRS for 
20 accounting standard. For future research, subjec-
tivity could be decreased by conducting Focus 
Group Discussion to assess the degree of conver-
gence; (ii) this study uses data investor protection 
taken from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, and 2006). 
The disadvantage is that data were not up to 
date. Even though the data were still relevance to 
measure investor protection, further research could 
use other up dated data to measure investor protec-
tion; (iii) the sample of companies in this study is 
the companies included in the CLSA survey. Com-
panies selected as the respondents on that survey 
are in large-scaled companies. Therefore, these re-
sults may not be generalized for small-scale firms; 
and (iv) this study uses only two-year study period, 
which is 2004 and 2006. Further research should 
expand the research period. 
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